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Something happened in 2003-04: transsexuals and transsexuality in Iran suddenly became 
a hot media topic, both in Iran and internationally.  
 
The medical practice of sex-change by means of surgery and hormones dates to at least 
the early 1970s in Iran; for nearly three decades the topic had received occasional 
coverage in the Iranian press, including a series of reports (presumably based on real 
lives)  published in a popular magazine, Rah-i zindigi [Path of Life], beginning in 1999. 
<1>  Iranian press coverage of “trans” phenomena increased sharply in early 2003, 
however, and it has continued intensely ever since—sometimes reporting directly on 
transsexuals and transsexuality, and sometimes reporting on it in the context of other 
people marked as “vulnerable to social harm,” such as prostitutes (both male and female) 
and runaway girls, who reportedly live trans-dressed lives.  It was these latter two topics 
that drew the attention of documentary filmmaker Mitra Farahani, to the subject of 
transsexuals in Iran. Her documentary Just a Woman won international acclaim at the 
2002 Berlin Gay and Lesbian Film Festival and elsewhere, and seems to have ignited 
broader international attention to the issue of transsexuality in Iran. A flurry of articles 
appeared in the world press in 2004-05. The Guardian, for example, wrote on 27 July 
2005 that “today, the Islamic Republic of Iran occupies the unlikely role of global leader 
for sex change,” and noted that “Iran has even become a magnet for patients from eastern   2 
European and Arab countries seeking to change their genders.” A number of television 
documentaries in France, Sweden, Holland and the United Kingdom followed, as well as 
several independent documentary film productions (Abdo 2000; Fahti 2004; Eqbali 2004; 
McDowall and Khan 2004; Harrison 2005; Stack 2005; Tait 2005). 
 
The celebratory tone of many of these reports—welcoming recognition of transsexuality 
and the permissibility of sex-change operations—is sometimes mixed with an element of 
surprise: How could this be happening in an Islamic state? In other accounts, the 
sanctioning of transsexuality is tightly framed by comparisons with punishments for 
sodomy and the presumed illegality of homosexuality—echoing, as we shall see, some of 
the official thinking in Iran. <2> 
 
While transsexual surgeries are not new in Iran, over the past decade such operations 
seem to have increased not only in publicity, but also in actual frequency.  At the first 
national symposium on transsexuality, “Studying Gender Identity Disorder,” held in the 
northeastern provincial capital of Mashhad in May 2005, Dr. Kahani from the national 
Legal Medical Board reported that in the fifteen years between 1987 and 2001, 200 males 
and 70 females had submitted sex-change petitions to the Board, 214 of which had been 
approved. Over the next four years, between 2001 and 2004, another 200 petitions had 
been received. <3> Anecdotal statistics from a private sex-change clinic in Tehran point 
to similar increases—for the period 1985-1995, 125 of 153 clients went through partial or 
full sex-change operations; in the next decade, the numbers increased to 200 surgeries in 
a client population of 210.     3 
 
The increasing frequency of sex-change petitions and operations is not an un-
problematically positive development, empowering though this trend has been for 
transsexuals. Many political challenges are posed by framing transsexuality within a 
dominant mapping of sexuality that explicitly renders as diseased, abnormal, deviant and 
at times criminal any sexual or gender non-conformity (including transsexuality itself, as 
well as same-sex desires and practices).  For legal and medical authorities, sex-change 
surgeries are explicitly framed as the cure for a diseased abnormality, and on occasion 
they are proposed as a religio-legally sanctioned option for heteronormalizing people 
with same-sex desires or practices. Even though this possible option has not become state 
policy (because official discourse is also invested in making an essential distinction 
between transsexuals and homosexuals), recent international media coverage of 
transsexuality in Iran increasingly emphasizes the possibility that sex-reassignment 
surgery (SRS) is being performed coercively on Iranian homosexuals by a fundamentalist 
Islamic government (Ireland 2007). This narrative framing (along with similar ones 
concerning the suppression of women’s rights and other political and labor struggles) 
circulates within larger reductive and totalizing Euro-American discourses on Iran and 
Islam that equate them both with the most conservative factions of the Iranian 
government, and with the views of the most fundamentalist Islamists. Conservative 
forces in both Iran and the West have a common stake in ignoring the lively reform 
discourse and history of progressive activism within contemporary Iran that offers 
alternative notions of rights within an Islamic society, and of alternative modes of living 
a Muslim life.    4 
 
While the pressures on gays and lesbians in Iran to transition from one gender to another 
are very real, these pressures are not produced primarily by fear of criminality. <4> On 
the contrary: the religio-legal framework of transsexuality has been productive of 
paradoxical, and certainly unintended, effects that at times benefit homosexuals. Simply 
put, the religio-legal prohibition of same-sex practices does contribute to pressures on 
gays and lesbians to consider transsexuality as a religiously sanctioned legal alternative 
(which is particularly important for religiously observant persons), but instead of 
eliminating same-sex desires and practices, it has actually provided more room for 
relatively safer semi-public gay and lesbian social space, and for less conflicted self-
perceptions among people with same-sex desires and practices. As one pre-op FtM 
(female-to-male transsexual) succinctly put it: “Once I was diagnosed as TS, I started 
having sex with my girl-friend without feeling guilty.” 
 
A Brief History of Transsexuality in Iran 
Some of the earliest discussions in Iran of transgenderism and transsexuality appeared in 
the 1940s, within a body of popular marital and parental advice literature translated into 
Persian (largely from American popular psychology authors) in which discussions of 
love, desire, sex, and marriage supplied occasions to write about gender disidentification, 
homosexuality, intersex conditions, and sex-change. (Some of the earliest discussions of 
transgenderism and transsexuality in Europe and the U.S. appeared in these very same 
sources). <5> Surgeries to alter congenital intersex conditions were reported in the 
Iranian press as early as 1930 (Ittila‘at, 27 October 1930), and the intensification of   5 
reporting on these surgeries in the 1940s and ‘50s forms an important backdrop to the 
subsequent history of transsexuality in Iran. By the late 1960s, notions of “gender 
disorder” and hormonal or genetic “sex and gender determination” began to enter Iranian 
medical discourse via translated behavioral psychology books and medical texts.  The 
earliest non-intersex sex-change surgery reported in the Iranian press (that I have found 
so far) dates to February 1973 (Kayhan, 17 February 1973), and by the early 1970s, at 
least one hospital in Tehran and one in Shiraz were carrying out SRS. A 1976 report by 
Dr. Kariminizhad of Jahanshah Saleh Women’s Hospital stated that over the previous 
three years, some fifty persons with transsexual tendencies had been seen at the hospital, 
and that 20 of them had gone through SRS (Kayhan, 11 October 1976.)  Around the same 
time, the Medical Association of Iran (MAI), a professional state-affiliated organization 
of physicians, began discussing the medical ethics of surgical sex-change. In a 1976 
decision, the MAI declared that sex-change operations, except in intersex cases, were 
ethically unacceptable—a ruling that was not reversed for more than a decade. 
 
As early as 1967, Ayatollah Khomeini had published a fatwa sanctioning sex-change, but 
this ruling, issued by a dissident Khomeini then still living in exile in Iraq, did not 
influence the policies of legal or medical institutions in Iran. (Khomeini 1967, Vol. 2: 
753-755.) There is no unanimity of opinion among leading clerics in Iran on the issue 
transsexuality. Numerically speaking, the majority of opinion-issuing clerics consider 
only intersex surgeries to be acceptable unequivocally. The opinion that ultimately 
matters, however, is that of the cleric(s) in political power, regardless of relative religious 
authority. The historically specific relationship between jurisprudential and political   6 
authority that has characterized Iran since the early 1980s translates clerical opinion, 
sanctioned through a complex legal process, into the law. With Ayatollah Khomeini as a 
politically unchallenged supreme authority after the 1979 revolution until his death in 
1989, the reissuance  in 1985 of his 1967 fatwa on SRS, in Persian this time rather than 
Arabic, set in motion the process that culminated in new state-sanctioned medico-legal 
procedures regarding transsexuality. <6> 
 
From the earliest pronouncement to present-day opinions, reflections on transsexual 
surgery in Iran seem to have been informed in part by linking these bodily changes to 
similar questions posed about intersex bodies. Classical Islamic discourse categorized 
every human body as either male or female, yet accepted the possibility that in the case of 
hermaphrodites it was difficult and at times impossible to determine the body’s “true 
genus” (kind or type). <7> Jurisprudents then elaborated rules of behavior to deal with 
the possible threat of gender transgressions that such impossibility of knowing would 
produce (Sanders 1991). In its modern reconfiguration, jurisprudents argued that new 
medical sciences could help unravel the puzzle of proper genus in difficult cases of 
hermaphroditism, and that medical technology could correct the manifestation of that 
genus. 
 
Importantly, by the 1960s, the approval of medicalized means for manifesting the proper 
genus of the hermaphroditic body converged with, and eventually (in the post-1979 
period) acted as, religious sanction for the emerging medico-psycho-behavioral discourse 
on gender and sexual dimorphism. Not only did the true sex become knowable in spite of   7 
ambiguous genitalia; a determinate relation among gender identification, gender role 
behavior, sexual desire, and subjective gender identity was envisioned for each and every 
body. The convergence of these discourses consolidated a powerful religio-legal-psycho-
medical notion of “unnatural and deviant” sexualities that now circulates in the Iranian 
national press, in religious texts, in bio-medical and psychological writings, and in 
marital and parental advice literature. With the establishment and consolidation of the 
Islamic Republic in the 1980s, this discourse gained state support, finance, and force of 
law, providing the conditions of possibility for transsexuality in Iran on a new scale, 
while setting the contours within which transsexuals fight their battles and live their lives, 
often with imaginative successes, and at other times with frustration and terrible loss. 
 
The “trans-friendly” jurisprudential discourse on transsexuality that began as an 
elaboration on intersex discourse now approves of transsexuality on the discretionary 
grounds that it has not been specifically forbidden in the Qur’an. Invoking a distinction 
between the physical body and the soul, this discourse argues that in most people there is 
harmony between the two, but that in a small number of people a disharmony produces 
transsexuality; since we cannot change a person’s soul, but medical advances have made 
it possible to change a person’s body, transsexual surgery is a permissible solution to this 
disharmony between soul and body. As a discretionary matter, SRS is not required—nor 
even recommended—for a person diagnosed as transsexual, unless a religiously 
observant transsexual fears falling into sinful deeds. <8> Some of the more accepting 
people among the friends and kin of transsexuals have come to terms with transsexuality 
through understanding it as a “wonder of creation,” or sign of God’s power. Some trans-  8 
friendly and gay-friendly psychotherapists use the same language in working with 
families. While this may sound to many of us terribly “essentialist,” I have come to hear 
it as an alternatively enabling script, especially as compared to the more dominant (and 
no less essentialist) psycho-medical discourse. 
 
Public knowledge of transsexuality has been shaped not only by jurisprudential and 
biomedical discourses, but also by intensive coverage in the Iranian press (and to some 
extent by satellite television broadcasts). In addition to the previously mentioned reports 
in Rah-i zindigi, the topic of transsexuality has been covered in a number of magazines, 
such as Zanan, and Chilchiraq, and important dailies, such as I‘timad-i melli, I‘timad, 
Hamshahri, and Sharq, where long articles and interviews have appeared in medical and 
science sections. The “yellow press” also covers transsexuality, and for a brief period in 
2004-05 gave the topic frequent full-page coverage, sometimes featuring translated 
articles that had appeared in the international press. This sustained coverage, despite the 
lean quality of the content—sometimes repeating the same story in various issues of the 
same journal—has made transsexuality one of the stock attention-grabbing stories for the 
scandal sheets, along with stories about film stars’ lives, and various sexual and social 
scandals. The combination of kinds of coverage—with the dailies and science journals 
making transsexuality a respectable topic of social conversation, and the sensational press 
bringing it into popular knowledge—has made transsexuality a widely recognized topic, 
though by no means a generally approved-of one. It is possible that the increased 
frequency of SRS in the past decade has been enabled by this expansion of public 
discourse. Many transsexuals I listened to, especially those coming to Tehran from   9 
provincial towns, said they had found out about SRS clinics through the press coverage 
(including satellite broadcast of documentaries). 
 
What kind of subjectivity is afforded to transsexuals through their public recognition as 
strange creations or scandalously diseased bodies, and how do transsexuals themselves 
respond to these representations? Some of the intimate details of transsexuals’ lives 
reported in the tabloids would be unimaginable if the subjects were recognized as 
“normal heterosexuals.” It is only as transsexuals that their sexual lives become printable 
stories. What effects do this possibility of scandalous or “strange” public intimacy 
generate for conceptions of gender and sexuality more generally—especially given that 
the scandal sheets, like the rest of the press, have to be wary of violating the restrictions 
of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance? As Dupret and Ferrié have written of Egypt and 
Morocco, what happens when claims for certain intimate lives become possible largely 
through “publicizing the private,” their regulation justified through their potential 
criminality? (Dupret 2001; Ferrié 1995) When the cover of the tabloid visually frames the 
headlines about transsexuals with headlines about murder, urban crimes, and 
cannibalism, what kind of empathy can even a sympathetic transsexual story generate, 
bordered as it is by stories designed to provoke urban panic and moral revulsion? <9> 
 
Venturing into Ethnography 
It was with these uneasy thoughts that I began my research in Iran in May 2006. Two 
questions formed my initial thinking: First, in a cultural-legal context where same-sex 
desire is considered shameful and same-sex practices are illegal, but within which   10 
transsexuality, even if overwhelmingly understood as shameful, is nevertheless legal and 
state-subsidized, how does this configuration shape sexual and gender subjectivities?  
Second, how do insistent state regulations and religio-cultural codes and rituals 
concerning proper gender conduct shape sexual desires and gender subjectivities? How 
does this context map the terrain on which individuals come to identify as TS and decide 
how far to go in their transitions?  
 
For instance, the protocols of sex-change often involve a prolonged period of supervised 
transition, during which the person lives socially as the other gender. In Iran, I had 
imagined, this procedure would face difficulties because of a whole series of state 
regulations on gender segregation. How do people in transition, I wondered, how do they 
navigate gender regulations? Religious and state regulations aim to produce a sense of 
bodily appropriateness through daily observations of gendered homosocializing practices, 
whether at home (for religiously observant families), in streets and parks, or in offices 
and universities. What is the legally sanctified gender of a trans-dressed in-transition 
person, given that the public dress-code is so insistently gender-regulated? What might 
the “impossibility of living as the other gender” mean for the concepts and practices of 
sex-change?  Despite my initial forebodings, my ethnographic research (the results of 
which are summarized in what follows) soon made it clear to me that the explicit framing 
of transsexuality as linked with, and yet distinct from, homosexuality and other 
sexualities rendered deviant and sometimes criminal, has produced some highly 
paradoxical effects. 
   11 
The typical autobiographical narrative, as well as the diagnostic psychological 
symptomization and the supervised process of legal certification of transsexuality, have 
all keyed themselves to the distinction established between transsexuality and 
homosexuality. A typical autobiographical narrative begins with the familiar recounting 
of a childhood in which the subject did not wish to dress and play gender-appropriately. 
Popular parental advice psychology literature now routinely warns parents about such 
early symptoms. Parents are advised to not encourage such childhood tendencies by 
thinking of cross-gender behavior as cute; they are told to consult child psychologists to 
get help in dealing with this “problem” as early as possible, to prevent the “full blown 
stage” of adult transsexuality.  
 
In the dominant narrative of the transsexual life-course, a cross-gendered childhood 
usually leads to a troubled adolescence in which same-sex desires torment the subject, 
especially given that all schools in Iran are gender-segregated. The strong relationship 
between childhood “transgender symptoms” and adolescent “sexual symptoms” signals 
the many ways in which gender and sex are not taken to be distinct categories in all 
registers in Iran. Indeed, in some registers, lives are made possible through that very 
indistinction – as in the case of certified non-operated transsexuals who would become 
illegal subjects should “transgender” (i.e., non-medicalized cross-gender living) become 
widely accepted as distinct from transsexual. 
 
Transsexuals who profess religious beliefs usually emphasize that they had not engaged 
in any same-sex acts despite persistent desires. Others hint at same-sex activities as a   12 
further corroboration of their transsexuality. Both groups tend to recite a series of school 
troubles, leading to parents being informed that their child has “problems,” referrals to 
psychologists, possibly dropping out of school or being expelled if suspected of improper 
sexual activities. These troubled years begin the long process toward eventual gender 
transition. 
 
Often this is the beginning of long family battles. Parents resort to sometimes horrifying 
measures to dissuade their adolescent teenagers from their contrarian sexual/gender 
desires. Some transsexuals succeed in hiding their sexual/gender desires from parents and 
improvise their own livable patterns. Even post-op, some live complicated multiple lives 
to be able to stay connected to their families. They leave home dressed as one gender, 
then change to the other. This strategy is easier for FtMs who can just take off their outer 
covers, than for MtFs who must not only adjust clothes, but also apply make-up under 
bridges, in garages, in public toilets in parks, and other available public spaces--all of 
which are potentially dangerous for them, with regular reports of MtF transsexuals who 
have been attacked and occasionally murdered in such locations.  
 
Adolescents sent by school authorities or concerned parents for help from therapists and 
physicians are sometimes diagnosed as “afflicted by GID,”  and often find themselves 
thrown into a combative situation with therapists who decide to cure them of these wrong 
gender/sexual desires. The latter include both mainstream psychologists as well as a 
vocal group of psychotherapists who advocate and practice Islam-therapy (sometimes 
called spiritual therapy).  Adolescence is the period in which many transsexuals,   13 
especially MtFs, find family life either unbearable and leave, at least temporarily, or are 
thrown out by families. Family severance is a very serious social issue, as so much of 
one’s life is defined and made possible (or impossible) through one’s location within an 
intricate network of extended family members, family friends, and acquaintances. Thus, 
severance from family often means not only emotional hardship and homelessness for 
prospective transsexuals, but also a loss of education and job opportunities. While 
transsexuals tend to find each other and form alternative kin worlds of their own, they 
often face enormous problems in the immediate period of being thrown out into a hostile 
world. MtFs are much more likely to face this predicament than FtMs. Correspondingly, 
family reconciliation is often easier for FtMs than MtFs. Several close relatives of 
(pre/non/post-op) FtMs explicitly said their acceptance of their daughter/sister becoming 
a son/brother would have been unimaginable if it had been the other way around.  
 
The reason for this disparity is not simply gender bias, though it is that too—namely, the 
preference for a male off-spring.  More importantly, the disparity arises from the 
repugnance and shame that the culture associates with “passive” male same-sex practices. 
MtFs seem, sadly and ironically, to live forever under the sign of being kunis (literally 
meaning “anal,” but in Persian connoting receptive of anal penetration), even though that 
is precisely what in many cases they are trying to disavow and move away from through 
sex-change. <10> In their autobiographical narratives, many reiterate that they have 
never allowed themselves to be anally penetrated even with their long-time boyfriends, 
and that they have been patiently going through the legal and medical changes in order to 
acquire a vagina before they get married. Yet, their physiological changes and their   14 
insistent self-narrativizations notwithstanding, they continue to carry the burden of that 
stigmatization with them even post-operatively. For their families, they remain a life-long 
source of shame among their kin and neighborhood networks. Even families that have not 
reconciled with their offspring “lost” to sex-change sometimes move to a new 
neighborhood or town in order to live again without shame.  The insistence of many 
transsexuals to distinguish themselves individually and as a group from homosexuals is 
thus not simply because of the religio-legal status of transsexuality, and their need to 
protect themselves from charges of homosexuality; this attempted disarticulation 
nevertheless carries with it, and participates in regenerating, a sign of stigmatization. It is 
a delineating move that in fact reinforces a burden they cannot shed.  
 
Filtering 
The legal process of gender transition is firmly framed by the pivotal distinction between 
homosexuality and transsexuality.  Colloquially referred to as “filtering,” legal gender-
transitioning involves a four-to-six month course of psychotherapy, accompanied by 
hormonal and chromosomal tests. It aims to distinguish and segregate “true transsexuals” 
(for whom any same-sex desire and even hints of same-sex practices are considered 
symptomatic of their transsexuality) from misguided or opportunist homosexuals (whose 
same-sex desires and practices are viewed as signs of moral deviancy) seeking to avoid 
anti-homosexual censure. <11> In the worst cases, filtering establishes a very hostile and 
at times terrifying relationship between the therapist and the client. This is particularly 
the case with those therapists who practice Islam-therapy. Several transsexuals recounted 
contemplating or attempting suicide during the filtering process. Other therapists,   15 
however, actually have used filtering to support their gay and lesbian clients, and to form 
separate individual and group sessions for them, thereby providing important social 
venues. 
 
As I have already hinted, the very process of psychological filtering and jurisprudential 
wall-building between gender and sexual categories, far from eliminating gays and 
lesbians (if that is indeed what the authorities hope for), paradoxically has created new 
social spaces. Instead of constructing an impassable border, the process has generated a 
porously marked, nebulous, and spacious domain populated by a variety of “not-normal” 
people. In order to persuade some gays and lesbians (“symptomatic homosexuals”) to 
consider transing bodily, and to filter out the true (“morally deviant”) homosexuals, this 
process needs to offer a safe passage between categories.  As the filtering and sorting 
processes depend above all on individual self-narratives, the potential uses of this 
“nebula” are limited only by each involved person’s creativity—a decidedly abundant 
resource.  
 
As a wise friend urged me back in 2005, before I began my field research, “Don’t worry, 
people are very creative and make their own uses.” And this is what I have in fact 
learned: not to underestimate the real problems and challenges, and at times dangers, that 
transsexuals, gays, and lesbians face in Iran, but also to see the productivity (in a 
Foucauldian sense) of the power of legal-medical-religious regulations, as well as the 
creativity with which transsexuals, gays, and lesbians use the spaces such regulative   16 
power provides, and the ways in which their active participation and struggles change 
things.  
 
Here is where refusing a distinction between sex and gender has been very productive. 
One can live what we may name a transgendered life (that is, non-operated yet 
sex/gender discordant) as a certified transsexual. This is perfectly legal and religiously 
permissible. As one trans-friendly cleric, Hujjat al-Islam Kariminia, agreed in the course 
of our many conversations and written communications, physiological transitioning is 
something that is allowed but not required. This means that a certified transsexual can, 
but does not have to, take hormones or go for surgery. S/he can legally live as the other 
gender. While legal and religious officials do not like this, they cannot do much about it. 
They are not being lenient and tolerant; rather, the very mechanisms of their project to 
filter and sort homosexuals from transsexuals depends on turning a blind eye on the 
“space of passing” across the very walls they have tried to erect. 
 
Indeed, one doesn’t even have to engage with the filtering process to be able to speak, at 
least in some spaces, as openly gay. In official circumstances, homosexually-oriented 
persons, with or sometimes without certification as transsexual, refer to themselves in a 
variety of ways.  For example, one man who, in a safer space, self-identified as gay, 
would say in a weekly TS group session held at the Social Emergency Unit of Welfare 
Organization, “I am not sure what I am, maybe I am gay, maybe I am TS, I am here to 
find out.” In the 2005 Mashhad seminar on gender identity disorder, an MtF-looking 
person from the audience asked Hujjat al-Islam Kariminia about rules for certain   17 
religious observances for “those of us who are bilataklif  [undecided, ambivalent, in a 
conundrum]. Do we enter the Imam Riza Shrine through the men’s entrance or the 
women’s?” Hujjat al-Islam Kariminia’s response was very telling: “You should go 
through the entrance that is appropriate for how you are dressed.” This would, of course, 
not resolve their actual dilemma, in contrast to their hypothetical jurisprudential one; for 
upon entering the apparently-gender-appropriate entrance, one is subjected to bodily 
security searches which would result in serious trouble for a TS. Yet Kariminia’s answer 
itself was what astonished me, because in a conversation in his office in Qum, in 
response to my suggestion that transsexuals should be allowed to live as transgender and 
not necessarily be pushed to hormonal and surgical treatment, he had insisted that the 
anatomical body defined maleness or females in Islam. In a later conversation, however, 
he agreed that certified transsexuals could trans-dress, and in a written communication he 
confirmed that they could even live as the other gender in all ways except for having sex 
with someone of their own bodily sex. Clearly, the context of asking made for different 
responses, as anyone familiar with the tradition of Islamic (or Jewish) responsa literature 
would immediately recognize. 
 
The legal and religious authorities, in short, have a stake in keeping open the nebulous 
domains of passing, even as they try to clear them of any “opportunistic squatters” and 
keep their population under surveillance. <12> The passageways across the porous 
boundaries between homosexuals and transsexuals at times fuels the hostility of some 
MtFs (especially those who are post-op) towards gay men. In keeping with general social 
attitudes, they consider gay men to be shamefully anally receptive, and suspect them to   18 
be actual or potential sex workers and HIV-carriers; “They give us all a bad name” was 
an oft-repeated phrase.  Despite all these challenges, however, these passages ought to 
remain open.  
 
Alternative Alliances 
Recently, an alternative alliance has emerged between some MtF transsexuals and gay 
men. <13> They argue that they share much in common as people who differ from social 
norms and expectations, and that the state-regulated filtering process should not become a 
hostile division among them. In 2006, one transsexual group began to welcome gays and 
lesbians to its weekly meetings. <14> These emerging openings and alliances have begun 
to create conditions for re-thinking and re-appropriating dominant cultural concepts. In 
the TS meeting held in the Welfare Organization, a gay man argued before a government-
appointed social worker that since the culture named them all as deviants, those who 
were thus labeled therefore possessed the power to redefine what that label might mean. 
Think metaphorically of driving, he argued that most people take the straight highway to 
get where they want to go, but gays, lesbians, and transsexuals deviate from the straight 
path and take some side roads—a much more interesting way to travel than the boring 
straight highway. Even within such relatively open and hospitable spaces, however, the 
overall social stigmatization of gay men and transsexual women produces enormous 
pressure to police each other’s lives. The public appearance of MtFs, many of whom 
often display their femininity by “excessive” styles of clothes and make-up, in a social 
context where female public visibility is heavily scrutinized, is a continuous subject of   19 
approbation by others. MtFs who are even rumored to engage in sex-work are a 
continuous target of harsh criticism. 
 
I do not wish to deny the enormous pressures on gays and lesbians to physically 
transition, which some gays and lesbians do consider in order to make their lives more 
livable. Their decision to transition derives not merely from religious sanctions nor as a 
result of enforcing laws against same-sex practices. It cannot be dismissed simply as a 
“false recognition” achieved under therapeutic duress, nor incited by the media (as in the 
formula, “I read an article or saw a TV program and now realize I am TS”). Nor does it 
represent a “lack of imagination,” as one diasporic self-identified queer Iranian once put 
it to me. Such moments of medico-psychological diagnosis or self-recognition are 
occasioned by larger social and cultural patterns of gender and sexual life, in particular 
the pressure to marry and form families. They are informed by all the simple pleasures of 
daily life from which same-sex partners are excluded; as one such woman said, “We 
can’t be together at Nawruz [Persian new year]; each of us has to be with her family. We 
start every new year in separation.” 
 
The social expectation for every adult to get married, later if not sooner, affects sexual 
and gender relations in important ways. While there has been a great deal more open pre-
marital sexual  experimentation (including same-sex activities) among adolescents and 
young adults in recent years, these remain just that: pre-marital. Male-male and female-
female couples live under, and compete with, the severe threat of the marriage demand. 
At times, “passive” males overact their femininity in a desperate attempt to avert the   20 
threat of a “real” woman and the loss of their male partner to marriage. The same is true 
of female-female couples: there are abundant sad narratives of long-term lesbian relations 
breaking apart because the “femme” partner finally opted for marrying a “real” man (or 
finally gave in to familial and social expectations to do so), in spite of the heroic butch 
performance of her former lover. This same pressure for marriage informs the dominant 
culture’s deep investment in the performance of masculinity and femininity, and partially 
accounts for heavily gender-coded roles within same-sex partnerships.  This, perhaps 
even more than the illegality of same-sex practices and the legality of transsexuality, 
pushes some people who may otherwise define themselves as butch lesbians and 
effeminate gays towards transing. They expect transing to make marriage available to 
them and, in a few instances, to salvage a threatened same-sex relation. Nevertheless, 
relationships involving transsexuals still always exist under the threat of inauthenticity. 
Post-op transsexuals, even though they have aspired to be bodily like the other sex, are 
often dismissed as “plastic replicas,” and social pressures sometimes lead the partners to 
contemplate leaving a “fake” man or woman for a “real” one–as many post-op break-up 
stories reiterate and repeat.  Despite the circulation of such sad stories, the larger social 
pressures for marriage continue to push some people in the transsexual direction.   
 
Conclusion 
Having provisionally mapped some configurations of sexuality and gender in 
contemporary Iran, I will conclude with a few questions that may be of interest for 
transnational comparison.  What does it mean that concepts of gender, sex, and 
sexuality—along with their (in)distinction from, and relations to, one another—have been   21 
formed in a context that has not been shaped to any substantial degree by the identity 
politics of gender and sexuality, or by queer activism and queer critical theory?  Some of 
the distinctions between these categories within Euro-American contexts, including the 
distinction sometimes made between transgender/transsexual (based on the body that has 
been surgically modified), have been shaped over the past couple of decades by a 
particular set of political struggles and debates. How do seemingly similar assignations 
mean differently (or not) within a different politics of sex, sexuality, and gender? While 
identity struggles have raged within transnational diasporic Iranian communities, many 
gays, lesbians, and transsexuals in Iran wish to keep national and international politics 
out of their daily lives. Indeed, some have become quite wary of international coverage of 
transsexuality in Iran, feeling that the effects of such coverage, within this volatile scene 
of meaning-making, is beyond their control. Despite their aversion to the international 
politics of human and civil rights for sexual and gender identities, some of these global 
discussions have nevertheless reached Iran through web-logs, satellite TV broadcasts, and 
other transnational media. Loan-words such as straight, gay, lesbian, transsexual, 
homosexual, top, bottom, and versatile, among many other expressions, pronounced in 
Persian just as they are in English, are freely used in these discussions.  How do these 
enunciations mean differently, and do a different cultural work, in Tehran compared to 
New York? Perhaps, one of the problems with the current heated debates between 
proponents of “global gay” and opponents of “gay international” resides in their common 
presumption that “I am gay,” or that “I am transsexual,” means the same thing anywhere 
it is pronounced. <15> 
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1. These reports ran from 4 February 1999 to 5 January 2000. The same journal ran 
another series of autobiographical essays from 22 November 2003 to 22 November 2005. 
This body of writing constitutes the most extensive published transsexual narratives we 
have. 
 
2. I say “presumed illegality of homosexuality,” because what is a punishable offense is 
sexual acts between members of the same sex, with anal penetration of one man by 
another (liwat /sodomy) being a capital offense. In international coverage, liwat is almost 
always translated as homosexuality. The problem with this translation is that such reports 
find their way back into Persian, and in their Persian effects they converge with the 
medical and psychological discourses in which the dominant concepts are sexual 
orientation and typologies of desire, centered on the naturalness of heterosexuality. In 
that domain, instead of the legal-jurisprudential category of sodomy, it is homosexuality 
[rendered in Persian as hamjisgara’i, being inclined to a person of one’s own sex] that is 
discussed as a sexual deviation along with a whole gamut of other deviations. While most 
theologically trained persons use liwat, more often than not, professionals (social 
workers, surgeons, and therapists) use hamjisgara’i. It is this slippage between the two 
concepts in different registers that are increasingly crossing paths -- especially within 
various state institutions that deal with transsexuals-transgenders and with some 
individuals who do name themselves gay or lesbian -- that makes me cautious about a 
simple usage of this term. I am concerned about keeping this distinction because in 
conversations in Iran it became quite clear that this is a productive distinction for many 
Iranian gays and lesbians, who find a degree of safety in insisting that homosexuality is   24 
not illegal, providing them with a sense of possibility of testing public spaces where some 
indication of their sexual desires (keeping it clear of what sex they do) may be a worthy 
risk. When I quote from English documentary sources, I have no way of knowing which 
term had been used in Persian, except in case of documentaries that have Persian sound 
track. 
 
3. Shakhis, 24 May 2005. More recently, the Welfare Organization reported that it 
received three new TS applications a day. Other reports estimate the total number of 
transsexuals in Iran anywhere between 3000 to 5000, and sometimes as high as 25,000. 
My use of TS in this article is occasioned by its usage as a self-identification category 
among Iranian transsexuals. It is used in Persian pronounced ti-es. 
 
4. I realize this is a controversial claim, since much of the current coverage of 
transsexuality in Iran claims otherwise. My conclusions in this paper are based on field-
work in Iran over 2006-07 which is impossible to present at any length within the scope 
of an article. While transsexuals, gays, and lesbians whom I listened to over that period 
expressed many anxieties, fears, desires, and dreams, none was related to anything that 
was linked with fear of criminality. The issue of criminality is of course not trivial: 
criminality, and in particular capital punishment of sodomy, dynamizes many other legal 
restrictions and social fears. 
 
5. Among them: Christian Jorgensen, Elizabeth Call, Vince Jones, Juliet (formerly Julius, 
no last name given in report), Robert Allen, Edwin Emerton, Roberta Cowell, Rollando   25 
Cassioti, April Ashley (formerly George Jameson), Gino Malti, Jeanette Jiousselot, and 
Phoebe Simple. 
 
6. Favorable commentators often contrast Iran with other Muslim countries; the legality 
of certain medical technologies (not only SRS, but also a wide array of reproductive 
technologies) in the former and their illegality in some of the latter countries is narrated 
as if somehow linked with an ahistorical Shi‘i-Sunni divide. This perpetuates such 
historically unsound arguments as the claim that the gate of ijtihad [issuing 
jurisprudential opinion] was closed in the Sunni world, thus making Shi‘ism more open 
to change. While this argument may seem almost commonsensical (especially to many 
Shi‘is), it misses the key issue of the historically specific relationship between 
jurisprudential and political authority that has characterized Iran since the early 1980s, 
which translates clerical opinion into the state’s legal code. 
 
7. I use the word genus for jins in this context to highlight the distinction between what 
today is commonly referred to as sex [jins] and the earlier connotations of the same term 
in classical Islamic writings on this topic – an issue further elaborated in Najmabadi 
2008. 
 
8. Despite my own earlier foreboding (Najmabadi 2005; see also my critical self-
reflections on this piece in H-Net discussion. Posted on Sat, 19 May 2007, H-
Histsex@H-Net.msu.edu, Subject: Re: Reportage: Iran: Change Sex or Die), I know of   26 
no case in which a homosexual has been forced to change sex. Nor have I seen such 
evidence offered by commentators who claim punitive use of SRS for gays in Iran. 
 
9. Some of my thinking here has been deeply influenced by conversations with Judith 
Surkis on her current research project, “Scandalous Subjects: Indecency and Public Order 
in France and French Algeria.” 
 
10. The entry into Persian and wide circulation of “gay” (pronounced as in English) and 
less frequently “lezbish” (lesbian butch) may indicate (contrary to the presumption of 
imitation of or imposition by the “Gay International” on unsuspecting naïve Iranians) in 
part an attempt to move away from the burden of the stigma that kuni (and to a lesser 
extent baruni, used for the “active” partner in a lesbian relationship) carries with it. In 
other words, to the extent that the adoption of gay and lesbian into Persian nomenclature 
can be viewed as some sort of mimicry, it is a strategic move to shed the cultural stigma 
of kuni (and baruni). Other Englishisms serve similar cultural effects, as the wide use of 
bi-ef [BF] and gi-ef [GF] for boyfriend and girlfriend. Whether these language moves 
work or fail is not determined because of the presumed shortcoming of “mimicry,” nor 
because of the cultural power of domination by a presumed “gay international” that is 
exporting its identity categories in imperial fashion. Its potential source of trouble is the 
tight gender grid within which same-sex relationships in contemporary Iran are 
configured. This configuration is in turn an effect of the marriage imperative (see below) 
which shapes particular notions of masculine and feminine performance (within 
heterosexual relationships as well). Same-sex partners, however, are prone to “over-  27 
performance” because of dominant pressures and hazards of marginalized lives. In the 
context of South Asia, the adoption of such English words is sometimes seen as “a class-
specific rejection of indigenous categories.” See the thread Homosexual/gay/queer in 
June and July 2007 on H-Net Histsex. I am not convinced that such straight forward class 
delineations can be made. 
 
11. The process includes a series of written tests for which translations of MMPI 
(Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Index) and SCL-90-R (Symptom Checklist-90-R) are 
used to make sure the TS is not suffering from other mental disorders, and if so, to be 
treated first for these problems to make sure the presumed line of causality runs from TS 
to other symptoms rather than the other way around. TSs prepare for these tests and 
coach each other for oral interviews, much as graduating high-school students in Iran 
prepare for the national entrance exam to universities. Oral interviews cover questions 
about details of life stories, but also totally idio(syncra)tic questions and gestures, such as 
checking what kind of watch the person is wearing, if they have shaven legs, color 
preferences, how they squeeze a toothpaste tube (from bottom up or from the middle), 
etc. When TSs were recounting these questions, their laugher expressed better than 
anything else the performativity of this procedure – something that the officials are fully 
aware of, including therapists I interviewed.  
 
12. The legal and social scene is highly fluid as I write these lines. Some authorities try to 
tighten what they see as unfortunate loopholes; others in different ministries and state 
organizations have formed supportive working relations with TS activists and help them   28 
to neutralize or go around restrictions and get legal, medical, housing, and other material 
benefits. One of the challenges of my project, practically and analytically, is that over 29 
years after the revolution, the Iranian state remains highly fractured, internally changing, 
and volatile. While a lot has been written on the fractured nature of the Iranian political 
system since the revolution of 1979, early in my research it became clear that thinking of 
the state even as a fractured mosaic of competing and at times conflicting mini pieces 
would not do; perhaps a better visual imaginary would be pieces that are continuously 
shifting and changing colors, with no well-defined edges of any sort. How such a 
structure does not burst at the mobile junctions of these shifting pieces, how it does its 
stately work so-to-speak, is a question I put aside for now. This situation allows 
transsexuals (and other activists) to cultivate their own horizontal and vertical networks 
in and out of various governmental bodies that do not fit neat categorizations as 
governmental and non-governmental. While permitting a vast degree of creativity, it also 
makes their work highly susceptible to the ebbs and flows of rapid political changes that 
mark the country. Several trans-rights activists have emerged from the transsexual 
community over the past four or five years, and the current changes are above all their 
achievements. Their efforts to challenge and change the medical, legal, and police abuses 
that transsexuals and gay men (and to a much lesser extent lesbians, for a complicated set 
of reasons) face are very impressive. They go to various government bodies on an almost 
daily basis and lobby for their rights and the benefits they expect the government to 
provide for them. There are often setbacks. The legal hoops that they are often made to 
go through are mind-boggling, and it is a testament to their fighting spirit and their sense 
of citizenship that they continue their work. One major issue is the understandable desire   29 
of many post-op transsexuals to become “invisible” and live “normal lives.” This has 
meant a huge turnover of activists, and the loss of continuity and organizational 
experience. The legal process, and the existence of some social welfare support for 
transsexuals, does not of course mean transsexuals are not targets of threats, harassments, 
and arrests by police and paramilitary forces—but these attacks do not have a uniform 
pattern. There are highs and lows. In this, the transsexual community’s situation is not 
different from others who cross various “red lines” in Iran. Whether the attacks on gays 
and transsexuals are more severe than on other groups, or on other moral or political 
grounds, I do not know. I don’t know of any study that has actually brought together all 
the rape, adultery, and sexuality-charged trials and figured out if there is a pattern. I don’t 
know of anyone who has systematically studied the attacks on workers and students 
rights activists, women’s rights activists, journalists, political dissidents, and those on 
more ordinary daily ones, such as arrests of women on charges of bad-veiling and 
assaults on parties, with those of gays and gay parties, to know if there is a difference. 
 
13. Lesbians are largely absent from this scene. There seems to be a pattern in which f-f 
sexual and affective relationships and socializing networks take shape largely in non-
publicly-visible spaces. 
 
14. This was opposed by other MtFs and became a subject of much debate. The group 
subsequently had to cease its meetings, because the magazine in whose office the 
meetings were held was closed down. The magazine itself had been charged with   30 
crossing “red-lines” in its coverage of explicitly sexual topics in the language of 
psychology. 
 
15. Altman’s Global Sex (2001) as well as Massad’s Desiring Arabs (2007) and his 2002 
article are perhaps the most polarized points of this debate. Publication of these writings 
has generated a much larger conversation, especially among scholars and activists 
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